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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : American Embassy, Moscow

NO. 172

DATE AUG 25 1961

August 25, 1961

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

REF :

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

By CEA-1, S/S-1

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SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 34

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MILITARY

Negative

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EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Berlin. The Soviet Government responded with unusual promptness on August 18 to the Western notes of August 17 protesting closure of the sector borders between East and West Berlin. The Soviet reply sharply rejected the Western protest and repeated old Soviet charges concerning espionage and subversive activities mounted against the GDR from West Berlin. On August 23, the Soviets sent another note to the Embassy, protesting use by the Allies of the air corridors for transporting West German leaders to West Berlin, where, the note claimed, they engage in aggressive and hostile actions against the GDR and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet press maintained a steady output of material from and about Berlin, emphasizing the following themes: 1) Conditions in East Berlin are normal and the population of the GDR solidly supports the closing of the sector borders; 2) West Berlin and Bonn authorities, however, continue in their attempts to create an atmosphere of crisis and to launch provocations against the GDR; 3) the Vice President's visit and action by the U.S. and other Allies to increase their garrisons in West Berlin are desperate efforts to bolster Mayor Brandt and the Bonn "militarists"; 4) Bonn's efforts to promote counter-measures, including an economic boycott against the GDR, found no support in the West, and there is broad support throughout the world for a negotiated settlement on Berlin.

2. Mikoyan Visit to Japan. The Soviet newspapers presented Mikoyan's visit to Japan as though he was the most popular foreign visitor ever received there, claiming that the visit was of great political and historical significance, a turning-point in Japanese-Soviet relations. The impression created was that all political parties in Japan--Liberal Democratic, Socialist, and Communist--shared in Mikoyan's welcome and that, if conservatives had reservations on this score, they found it politically expedient to conceal them and to associate themselves with the welcome accorded Mikoyan.

The Soviet press obscured the critical reception by the Japanese press and official circles of Mikoyan's attacks on Japan's relations with the US and the Security Treaty by making it appear that criticism of Mikoyan and Soviet foreign policy in Japan was purely US handiwork.

3. CENTO DOCUMENTS. On August 18, the Soviet Government released to the press a number of alleged secret CENTO documents which purportedly revealed the aggressive intentions of CENTO against the USSR. The Soviets emphasized that the documents not only specified atomic attack targets in the Soviet Union, but also pinpointed localities on the territory of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and neutral Afghanistan where the West intended to use atomic weapons for interdiction purposes.

Accompanying Soviet press articles on the subject suggested that the alleged CENTO documents were released in an attempt: 1) to stimulate further the general Soviet campaign against US foreign bases; 2) to intimidate those nations which permit the use of their territory for US bases; 3) to discredit

the "defensive purposes" of CENTO and, by implication, of other alliances in the Western defense system, and 4) to distract attention from free-world attacks on the closing of the border between East and West Berlin.

4. CONGO. Soviet news despatches from Stanleyville, reporting on the Adoula visit there, noted in rather straightforward fashion that Gizenga had informed diplomatic representatives resident in Stanleyville that the Adoula Government had been confirmed by Parliament and recognized as the direct successor of the Lumumba government. In addition, the news reports indicated that Gizenga had agreed to participate in the Adoula Government as First Vice-Premier.

5. TUNIS. A brief TASS news despatch from Tunis indicated that a group of Soviet specialists had arrived in Tunis on August 22 to conclude talks on Soviet technical and economic assistance. The group included engineers, production specialists, and representatives of the State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations.

INTERNAL - POLITICAL

6. Pre-Congress Discussion of the Proposed Party Program and Statute. For over a month now, the Party agitprop machinery has propagandized the masses on themes related to the draft Party Program and Statute. In order to help channel the resultant "enthusiasm" along proper lines, a Central Committee announcement was made on August 23 that the preparation of special gifts dedicated to the XXII Congress should be discouraged since the practice was neither desirable nor useful (Pravda, August 23, 1961). Fulfillment and overfulfillment of plan-production goals were suggested as suitable substitutes for gifts. Obviously the CC announcement is designed to prevent dissipation of (state) time and money in such useless and artless projects as rugs and rococo vases bearing likenesses of Khrushchev, which ultimately are consigned to collect dust in some obscure museum.

On the other hand, "free discussion" of the draft party Program and Statute is considered both necessary and useful. Most of this "discussion" takes the form of letters to the editors or is conducted at mass meetings. Comments on the Program sometimes contain revealing insights into Soviet life and may ultimately be reflected in the Program or Statute, as finally adopted, as amendments. One interesting suggestion already reported (Despatch No. 163, August 24, 1961) concerns itself with the direct election of the secretary of primary organs. There have been several suggestions that control organs, such as the Commission for Party Control or the Commission of State Control, should occupy a place of importance in the Program, since they are the mechanisms through which unpaid volunteers will help supervise fulfillment of party goals.

One woman writer feels that because working women must not only do their jobs, but also care for their houses and families, the program should include a statement to "free women from work on night shifts." (Moskovskaya Pravda, August 23, 1961).

A collectively signed letter points out that absence of any concept of a quorum poses a problem. In a unit of 20 persons deciding upon the expulsion of a member, for example, the critical meeting might be attended by only 15; two-thirds of that number (10); or half the actual membership, would be sufficient to exclude a Communist from Party membership. The group feels that expulsion should require the vote of 90% of all members listed on the rolls and that the question of a legal quorum should be codified in the Statute.

In an interesting observation on the "cult of personality," an August 4 Pravda letter, signed by several old members of the CPSU, is emphatically endorsed by another writer who wants stronger language to attack that "evil" (Pravda, August 24, 1961). The same issue of Pravda contains the suggestion that all Communists should be required to give their children a Communist education.

7. Soviet Jazz Gets a Boost. In a long article published in Izvestiya on August 23, Soviet jazz composer A. Tsfasman criticizes the Ministry of Culture and the Union of Soviet Composers for not devoting sufficient addition to Soviet jazz (Despatch #170, August 24, 1961). Deploring the "half-recognition" accorded jazz, Tsfasman condemns the role playe by the Soviet press and cinema in deprecating jazz as a form of music by associating it with aspects of Soviet society of which the regime disapproves.

While defending Soviet jazz from domestic critics, Tsfasman echoes the general Soviet line on music, deploring the "complete disintegration abroad" of the basic elements of music, such as melody, harmony, and rhythm. Tsfasman claims that, to be acceptable, Soviet jazz must embody the esthetic essentials produced in all Soviet music and warns against a "perverted" form of jazz.

MILITARY

(Negative)

For the Charge d'Affairs ad interim.

R. T. Davies
First Secretary of Embassy

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